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We introduce a new formulation of asset trading games in continuous time in the framework
of the game-theoretic probability established by Shafer and Vovk (Probability and Finance: It’s
Only a Game! (2001) Wiley). In our formulation, the market moves continuously, but an investor
trades in discrete times, which can depend on the past path of the market. We prove that an
investor can essentially force that the asset price path behaves with the variation exponent
exactly equal to two. Our proof is based on embedding high-frequency discrete-time games
into the continuous-time game and the use of the Bayesian strategy of Kumon, Takemura and
Takeuchi (Stoch. Anal. Appl. 26 (2008) 1161–1180) for discrete-time coin-tossing games. We also
show that the main growth part of the investor’s capital processes is clearly described by the
information quantities, which are derived from the Kullback–Leibler information with respect
to the empirical fluctuation of the asset price.
Keywords: Bayesian strategy; beta-binomial distribution; game-theoretic probability; Ho¨lder
exponent; Kullback–Leibler information; modulus of continuity; square root of dt effect
1. Introduction
In this paper, we present a new formulation of asset trading games in continuous time,
in the framework of the game-theoretic probability of Shafer and Vovk [15]. In the book
by Shafer and Vovk, continuous-time games are formulated as limits of discrete-time
games by using techniques of nonstandard analysis. Although their approach is rigorously
formulated in the framework of nonstandard analysis, we give another formulation of
continuous-time games in the game-theoretic probability, which is tractable within the
conventional theory of analysis.
This is an electronic reprint of the original article published by the ISI/BS in Bernoulli,
2009, Vol. 15, No. 4, 1243–1258. This reprint differs from the original in pagination and
typographic detail.
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An asset trading game is a complete information game between an investor and the
market. Following Chapter 9 of Shafer and Vovk [15], we denote these two players as
“Investor” and “Market”. In our formulation, Market moves continuously, but Investor
moves in discrete times, depending on the past path of Market. The trading times of
Investor need not be equally spaced. In this paper, we mainly consider “limit order”
strategy (rather than the “market order” strategy) of Investor. In the limit order strategy,
Investor trades a financial asset when the asset price or the increment of the asset price
hits a certain level. We shall prove that by a high-frequency limit order type Bayesian
strategy, Investor can essentially force the variation exponent of two in the price path of
Market. The precise definition of essential forcing will be given in Section 2.
In an infinitely repeated series of fair betting games, a gambler cannot make gain with
certainty. This fact has been formulated and proven in the theory of martingales. But
when the games are favorable to a gambler, for example, if the results of the games are
stochastically independent with positive expected value, to what extent can he exploit the
situation and what would be a good strategy to adopt? Several years after the advent of
Shannon’s celebrated work [16], this problem was first systematically studied by Kelly [9]
in relation to the betting game interpretation of Shannon’s mutual information quantity.
In this spirit, betting games have been investigated by information theorists, which led
to the notion of Cover’s universal portfolios [2, 3]. One of the present authors also wrote
a note on it about forty years ago in Japanese, presenting the results in [18].
Recently, Shafer and Vovk originated a new, attractive field of game-theoretic prob-
ability and finance [15]. The most important point concerning their approach is that
stochastic behavior of Market is not assumed a priori, but follows from the protocol of
the game between Investor and Market. Shafer and Vovk established the general fact
that in order to prevent Investor from making an infinitely large gain, Market must be-
have as if he is stochastic and make the game fair in a stochastic sense. However, the
question remains as to what Investor can make from Market’s failure to do so. This issue
was treated by Kumon and Takemura [10], where it is proved that when Market’s moves
are bounded, a simple strategy forces the strong law of large numbers (SLLN) with a
convergence rate of O(
√
logn/n). Kumon, Takemura and Takeuchi [11] proved several
versions of SLLN for the case where Market’s moves are unbounded. For coin-tossing
games, Kumon, Takemura and Takeuchi [12] considered a class of Bayesian strategies for
Investor and established the important fact that if Market violates SLLN, then Investor
can increase his capital exponentially fast and the exponential growth rate is precisely
described in terms of the Kullback–Leibler information between the average of Market’s
moves when he violates SLLN and the average when he observes SLLN.
In this paper, we apply the results of [12] to asset trading games in continuous time.
We consider implications of high-frequency limit order type Bayesian strategies and prove
that Investor can make arbitrarily large gain if Market does not move jaggedly with the
variation exponent equal to two. In the mathematical finance literature, this phenomenon
has long been recognized and understood as the fact that fractional Brownian motion
with the Ho¨lder exponent H 6= 1/2 is not a semimartingale; see Rogers [14], Section 4.2 of
Embrechts andMaejima [6] and Section 3 of Hobson [7]. Kunitomo [13] presented a similar
result earlier. Note that in the measure-theoretic approach, these results require strong
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stochastic assumptions. Vovk and Shafer [23] treated the
√
dt effect using nonstandard
analysis. The game-theoretic approach in the present paper and in [23] is advantageous
because no probabilistic model, such as fractional Brownian motion, is imposed on the
paths of Market. It can be an arbitrary continuous path in our formulation. Another
fundamental strength of the game-theoretic approach is that we can give statements on
an individual path of Market, whereas in measure-theoretic probability, one can only
make statements on measurable sets of the space of appropriate paths.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate asset trading games
and introduce the necessary notation and definitions. We also review the results on the
Bayesian strategy of [12] for discrete-time games embedded into the continuous-time
game. We investigate the consequences of high-frequency Bayesian strategy in Section
3 and establish that Market is essentially forced to move with the variation exponent
exactly equal to two. We end the paper with some concluding remarks in Section 4.
2. Asset trading games in continuous time
In this section, we formulate asset trading games in continuous time and introduce ap-
propriate notation and definitions. We begin with an informal description of asset trading
games in continuous time and their embedded discrete-time games in Section 2.1. More
precise definitions of the game and the move spaces of the players are presented in Section
2.2. In particular, we will define the notion of essential forcing of an event by Investor.
In Section 2.3, we review notions of the variation exponent and the Ho¨lder exponent. In
Section 2.4, we summarize results on Bayesian strategy for coin-tossing games in [12].
2.1. Formulation of asset trading games in continuous time
Suppose that there is a financial asset which is traded in a market in continuous time.
Let S(t) denote the price of the unit amount of the asset at time t. We assume that
S(t) is positive and a continuous function of t. We consider the price path S(·) to be
chosen by the player “Market”. “Investor” enters the market at time t= t0 = 0 (knowing
the initial price S(0)) with the initial capital of K(0) = 1 and he can buy or sell any
amount of the asset at any time, provided that his capital always remains nonnegative.
It is assumed that Investor can trade only at discrete time points 0 = t0 < t1 < t2 < · · ·,
although he can decide the trading time ti and the amount he trades at ti based on the
path of S(t) up to time ti. Since S(t) is continuous, when we say “up to time ti”, we
do not need to distinguish whether Investor is allowed to use the value S(ti) or not. His
repeated tradings up to time ti also decide the amount Mi of the asset he holds for the
interval [ti, ti+1). Again, Mi can only depend on the path of S(t) up to time ti.
Let K(t) denote the capital of Investor (expressed in cash) at time t. It is written as
K(0) = 1,
(1)
K(t) = K(ti) +Mi(S(t)− S(ti)) for ti ≤ t < ti+1.
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In the case Mi < 0, K(t) is the capital at time t if he buys back |Mi| units of the asset at
the current price S(t). As mentioned above, Investor is required to keep K(t) nonnegative,
whatever price path S(·) Market chooses. Also, note that K(t) is continuous in t, since
S(t) is continuous in t.
By defining
θi =
MiS(ti)
K(ti) ,
we rewrite (1) as
K(t) =K(ti)
(
1 + θi
S(t)− S(ti)
S(ti)
)
for ti ≤ t < ti+1
in terms of the return (S(t)− S(ti))/S(ti) of the asset.
In this paper, we mainly consider the scenario where Investor decides the trading
times t1, t2, . . . by “limit order” strategy. Let δ1, δ2 > 0 be some constants and determine
t1, t2, . . . as follows. After ti is determined, let ti+1 be the first time after ti when either
S(ti+1)
S(ti)
= 1+ δ1 or
S(ti+1)
S(ti)
=
1
1 + δ2
. (2)
In this scheme, although Investor enters the market at time t0 = 0, he begins trading at
time t1. This process leads to a discrete-time coin-tossing game embedded in the asset
trading game as follows. Let
xn =
(1 + δ2)S(tn+1)− S(tn)
(δ1 + δ2 + δ1δ2)S(tn)
=
{
1, if S(tn+1) = S(tn)(1 + δ1),
0, if S(tn+1) = S(tn)/(1 + δ2).
The risk-neutral probability ρ of the coin-tossing game [12, 17] can be deduced from
1 = ρ(1 + δ1) +
1− ρ
1+ δ2
,
which yields
ρ=
δ2
δ1 + δ2 + δ1δ2
.
Also, write
K˜n =K(tn+1), νn = δ1 + δ2 + δ1δ2
1+ δ2
θn.
We then have the following protocol for an embedded discrete-time coin-tossing game.
Embedded Discrete-Time Coin-Tossing Game
Protocol:
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K˜0 := 1.
FOR n= 1,2, . . .:
Investor announces νn ∈R.
Market announces xn ∈ {0,1}.
K˜n = K˜n−1(1 + νn(xn − ρ)).
END FOR
This embedded discrete-time game allows us to apply results on coin-tossing games to
the asset trading game in continuous time. In particular, we can apply the strong law of
large numbers for coin-tossing games.
However, it should be noted that in the embedded game, Market may decide to keep
the variation of S(t) small after tn:
S(tn)
1 + δ2
< S(t)< S(tn)(1 + δ1) ∀t≥ tn.
The embedded coin-tossing game is then played for only n rounds and the SLLN cannot
be applied. Naturally, we are tempted to make δ1, δ2 smaller so that the total number
of rounds increases, and we expect that Investor’s high-frequency tradings take place
when δ1 and δ2 are small. But once δ1, δ2 are announced, Market can always make the
variation even smaller. This suggests that we should formulate the asset trading game
and the move spaces of the players more carefully.
2.2. Formal definition of asset trading games and the notion of
essential forcing
Here, we provide definitions of asset trading games and the move spaces of the players.
Also, we define the notion of essential forcing of an event.
Market is required to choose a positive continuous function S(·) as his price path. Let
Ω =C>0[R+]
denote the set of positive continuous functions on R+ = [0,∞). This is the move space
of Market, that is, Market chooses an element S(·) ∈ Ω. We also call Ω the path space
or sample space. A subset E of Ω is called an event. A variable is a real-valued function
f :Ω→R on the path space.
In order to define the move space of Investor, we need a game-theoretic definition of a
stopping time (see Section 5.3 of [15] and Section 1.1 of [8]) and a marked stopping time.
A variable τ :Ω→ [0,∞] is called a stopping time if it follows from
τ(S(·))<∞ and S(u) = S˜(u), 0≤ u < τ(S(·))
that τ(S˜(·)) = τ(S(·)). Investor’s trading times are stopping times. When τ(S(·)) = t <
∞, we say that τ is realized at time point t. Investor also decides how many units of the
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asset to hold at the time when τ is realized. A pair of variables
(τ,m) :Ω→ [0,∞]×R
is a marked stopping time if τ is a stopping time and m depends only on the path up to
the realized time of τ , that is,
τ(S(·))<∞ and S(u) = S˜(u), 0≤ u < τ(S(·)),
implies that m(S˜(·)) =m(S(·)). We call m the mark associated with the stopping time
τ . For definiteness, we define m(S(·)) = 0 if τ(S(·)) =∞.
A strategy P of Investor is a set of countably many marked stopping times
P = {(τ1,m1), (τ2,m2), . . .} (3)
with the additional requirement that the stopping times are “discrete” in the following
sense.
Definition 2.1. A set of countably many stopping times {τ1, τ2, . . .} is discrete if for
each S(·) ∈Ω there is no accumulation point of the set of realized stopping times.
In the above definition, we are not requiring τ1 ≤ τ2 ≤ · · ·. For example, a strategy of
Investor may consist of just two marked stopping times P = {(τ1,m1), (τ2,m2)}, where
τ1 is the first time S(t) hits a predetermined high value and τ2 is the first time S(t)
hits a predetermined low value. Then, τ1 may realize before τ2 or vice versa. We use the
notation τ(1) ≤ τ(2) ≤ · · · for the ordered realized stopping times.
By discreteness of the stopping times, we require Investor to trade only a finite number
of times in every finite interval. The limit order type strategy in (2) clearly satisfies this
requirement, because any continuous function on [0,∞) is uniformly continuous on the
finite interval [0, t]. Under the above requirement, given a strategy P of Investor and a
path S(·) of Market, the capital process KP(t) =KP (t, S(·)) of Investor is defined as in
(1), with ti = τ(i)(S(·)) andMi =m(i)(S(·)), provided that the realized stopping times are
all distinct. When realized time points of some stopping times coincide, for example when
Investor employs nested strategies, we need to deal with obvious notational complications
in adding up associated marks. But even when realized time points of some stopping times
coincide, it is clear that the discreteness requirement guarantees that the capital process
KP(t) is written as a finite sum for each t > 0.
Furthermore, we require that Investor observes his “collateral duty”, that is, starting
with the initial capital of KP (0) = 1, his strategy P must satisfy
KP(t, S(·))≥ 0 ∀t > 0,∀S(·) ∈Ω.
In summary, the move space F0 = {P} of Investor is the set of strategies in (3) satisfying
the discreteness of Definition 2.1 and the collateral duty.
We note that F0 is closed under finite static mixtures. Let Pj = {(τij ,mij)}∞i=1, j = 1,2,
be two strategies belonging to F0. For 0< c1, c2 < 1 with c1+ c2 = 1, Investor sets up two
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accounts with the initial capitals cj , j = 1,2. He then applies cjPj = {(τij , cjmij)}∞i=1
to account j. This mixture is written as c1P2 + c2P2 ∈ F0 with the capital process
Kc1P1+c2P2(t) = c1KP1(t) + c2KP2(t). By induction, it is clear that F0 is closed with
respect to any convex combination of a finite number of strategies.
In the spirit of game-theoretic probability, we assume that Investor first announces his
strategy P to Market and then Market decides his path S(·). Therefore, the protocol of
an asset trading game in continuous time is formulated as follows.
Asset Trading Game in Continuous Time
Protocol:
K(0) := 1.
Investor announces P ∈F0.
Market announces S(·) ∈Ω.
In game-theoretic probability, given some event E ⊂ Ω, Investor is interpreted as the
winner of the game if Market chooses a path S(·) ∈E or else Investor’s capital increases
to infinity. In this case, we say that Investor can force the event E. In order to prove
forcing of an event E, as shown in Shafer and Vovk [15], it is often useful to consider static
mixtures of countably many strategies of Investor. However in our formulation, countable
mixing involves a conceptual difficulty because such a mixture of trading strategies allows
Investor to trade infinitely many times in a finite interval. Hence, in this paper, we use
the following notion of “essential forcing” of an event E.
Definition 2.2. In the asset trading game in continuous time, Investor can essentially
force an event E if, for any C > 0, there exists a strategy PC ∈ F0 such that
sup
0≤t<∞
KPC (t, S(·))>C ∀S(·) ∈Ec.
In Section 4, we will discuss the fact that essential forcing implies forcing in the sense
of Shafer and Vovk [15] if we allow countable static mixtures. Therefore, the notion of
essential forcing is good enough for the development in the present paper. Also, note that
if Investor can essentially force a finite number of events E1, . . . ,EK , he can essentially
force the intersection E1 ∩ · · · ∩ EK by a finite mixture of appropriate strategies (cf.
Lemma 3.2 of [15]).
We also give a somewhat stronger definition of essential forcing for a finite interval
[T1, T2]⊂ [0,∞).
Definition 2.3. Investor can essentially force an event E ⊂ Ω in [T1, T2] if, for any
C > 0, there exists a strategy PC ∈ F such that
sup
T1≤t≤T2
KPC (t, S(·))>C ∀S(·) ∈Ec.
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2.3. Variation exponent and Ho¨lder continuity
Here, we summarize the notion of variation exponent and Ho¨lder exponent (see, e.g.,
Section 4.1 of [6]). A continuous function f on the interval [T1, T2] is called Ho¨lder
continuous (Lipschitz continuous) of order H on [T1, T2] if, for some C > 0,
|f(y)− f(x)|
|y− x|H ≤C, T1 ≤ ∀x < ∀y ≤ T2.
The largest value of such an H is usually called the modulus of continuity or the Ho¨lder
exponent. In this paper, we distinguish between several closely related notions and call
H an upper Ho¨lder exponent. In Section 3, we consider the set of functions
EH,C,T1,T2 =
{
S ∈Ω
∣∣∣ | logS(y)− logS(x)||y− x|H ≤C,T1 ≤ ∀x < ∀y ≤ T2
}
. (4)
We also consider the bounding of the modulus of continuity (jaggedness of S(·)) from
below. Let Q ⊂ [0,∞) be a given dense countable subset, such as the set of rational
numbers. We define
EH,C,T1,T2 =
{
S ∈Ω
∣∣∣ ∀ε > 0,∀x ∈ [T1, T2 − ε]∩Q,∃y ∈ (x,T2] :
(5)
| logS(y)− logS(x)| ≥CεH and | logS(y)− logS(x)||y− x|H ≥C
}
.
This definition of bounding the jaggedness from below by a lower Ho¨lder exponent H is
convenient for our limit order type strategy.
Finally, for A> 0, we write
EA,T1,T2 = {S ∈Ω | | logS(y)− logS(x)| ≤A,T1 ≤ ∀x < ∀y ≤ T2}. (6)
The modulus of continuity can also be understood from the viewpoint of total variation
of a continuous function. Here, we use the notion of strong p-variation from Section 11.6
of [15]. Let κ :T1 = t0 < t1 < · · ·< tn = T2 be a division of the interval [T1, T2]. For p≥ 1
and a continuous function f : [T1, T2]→R, define
varf (p) = sup
κ
n∑
i=1
|f(ti)− f(ti−1)|p,
where sup is taken over all positive integers n and all divisions κ. There exists a unique
value vexf ∈ [1,∞] such that varf (p)<∞ for p > vexf and varf (p) =∞ for p < vexf .
We call vexf the variation exponent of f . Note that each S ∈Ω is uniformly continuous in
the closed interval [T1, T2] and hence bounded away from 0 and +∞. Also, log′(S) = 1/S
is uniformly continuous in each compact interval of (0,∞). Therefore, S ∈ EH,C,T1,T2
implies vex logS ≤ 1/H and S ∈ EH,C,T1,T2 implies vex logS ≥ 1/H . Also, note that
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vex logS = vexS for S ∈Ω. From these relations, we call H = 1/vexS the Ho¨lder expo-
nent of S.
Results on the modulus of continuity of the paths of Brownian motion and fractional
Brownian motion are summarized in Chapter IV of [1], Section 4.1 of [6] and Section
11.6 of [15].
2.4. Bayesian strategy for coin-tossing games
As discussed in Section 2.1, we mainly consider the scenario where Investor decides the
trading times by the limit order type strategy in (2). In addition, we consider the situation
where Investor specifies Mi by the Bayesian strategy in [12]. Here, we briefly review the
results of [12].
Suppose that Investor models Market’s sequence of moves x1x2 · · · (xi ∈ {0,1}) in the
embedded discrete-time coin-tossing game of Section 2.1 by a probability distribution Q.
Let hn = nx¯n =
∑n
i=1 xi denote the number of heads and tn = n−hn denote the number
of tails. The beta-binomial model is defined as
Q(x1 · · ·xn) = 1
B(α,β)
∫ 1
0
phn+α−1(1− p)tn+β−1 dp
=
(Γ(α+ hn)/Γ(α))× (Γ(β + tn)/Γ(β))
Γ(α+ β + n)/Γ(α+ β)
,
where α,β > 0 are fixed and correspond to the prior numbers of heads and tails. We
denote the conditional probability of xi = 1 under Q given x1, . . . , xi−1 by
pˆQi = pˆ
Q
i (x1, . . . , xi−1) =Q(xi = 1 | x1, . . . , xi−1).
In this model,
pˆQn =
B(α+ hn−1 +1, β + tn−1)
B(α+ hn−1, β + tn−1)
=
α+ hn−1
α+ β + n− 1
and the Investor’s associated beta-binomial strategy is
ν∗n =
pˆQn − ρ
ρ(1− ρ) . (7)
The capital process K˜∗n for this Bayesian strategy is explicitly written as
K˜∗n(x1 · · ·xn) =
Q(x1 · · ·xn)
ρhn(1− ρ)tn . (8)
When both hn and tn are large, by using Stirling’s formula
logΓ(x) = (x− 12 ) logx− x+ log
√
2pi+O(x−1),
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we can evaluate the log capital process log K˜∗n as
log K˜∗n = nD
(
hn
n
∥∥∥ρ
)
− 1
2
logn+O(1),
where
D(p‖q) = p log p
q
+ (1− p) log 1− p
1− q
denotes the Kullback–Leibler information between 0< p< 1 and 0< q < 1. This expres-
sion, together with the Taylor expansion
D(ρ+ δ‖ρ) = δ
2
2ρ(1− ρ) +O(δ
3),
allows us to analyze the behavior of the capital process for a high-frequency Bayesian
strategy of Investor in the next section.
3. Essential forcing of variation exponent in the asset
trading game
Consider the asset trading game in continuous time in Section 2.2 and the events
EH,C,T1,T2 in (4), EH,C,T1,T2 in (5) and EA,T1,T2 in (6). In this section, we prove the
following main result of this paper.
Theorem 3.1. For every H > 0.5,A > 0,C > 0,0 ≤ T1 < T2 ≤ T , Investor can essen-
tially force
EH,C,T1,T2 ⇒EA,T1,T2 .
For every H < 0.5,A> 0,C > 0,0≤ T1 < T2 ≤ T , Investor can essentially force
EH,C,T1,T2 ⇒EA,T1,T2 .
Here “E1⇒E2” stands for Ec1∪E2 (Section 4.1 of [15]) for two events E1,E2 ⊂Ω. Also,
from the proof of the theorem below, it will be clear that Investor can essentially force
these events in the interval [T1, T2]. This theorem roughly says that within an arbitrarily
small constant ε > 0, Market’s path is essentially forced to have the variation exponent
2− ε < vexS < 2 + ε, unless he stays constant. However, as we again discuss in Section
4, there is some gap between the two events (4) and (5). A stronger statement in terms
of the variation exponent vexS itself is now given in Theorem 1 of Vovk [21].
We give a proof of Theorem 3.1 after some preliminary investigations of the limit
order type strategy in Section 2.1 combined with the Bayesian strategy in Section 2.4 for
the embedded discrete-time game. Our proof is based on the limit order type strategy
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with sufficiently small δ1 = δ2 in (2). After the proof, we also investigate the behavior of
Investor’s capital processes for the cases where δ1 and δ2 decrease with different rates.
First, note that it suffices to consider the case T1 = 0, because we can think of Investor
as entering the game at time t = T1 instead of t = 0 and using the strategy described
below from T1 on. Writing simply T = T2, we thus consider only the case [T1, T2] = [0, T ].
We take the limit order type strategy in Section 2.1. Write δ = (δ1, δ2), where δ1, δ2 > 0.
Let t0 = 0 < t1 < t2 < · · · be the sequence of Investor’s trading time points determined
by (2). We then have the embedded discrete-time coin-tossing game and the associated
Mn’s are determined by the Bayesian strategy in Section 2.4 in the form of ν
∗
n in (7).
The parameters α,β > 0 for the Bayesian strategy are fixed throughout the rest of this
section. It is clear that the resulting strategy P = Pδ1,δ2,α,β satisfies the collateral duty
KP(t, S(·))≥ 0, ∀t > 0, ∀S(·) ∈Ω. We use the notation
ηi = log(1 + δi), δi = e
ηi − 1, i= 1,2,
and η = (η1, η2). Define n
∗ = n∗(T, δ,S(·)) by tn∗ < T ≤ tn∗+1. Note that
n∗(T, δ,S(·))≥ A
max(η1, η2)
for every S(·) ∈EcA,0,T . Therefore, n∗ can be made arbitrarily large, uniformly in S(·) ∈
EcA,0,T , by taking δ1, δ2 sufficiently small.
K(T ) =KPδ1,δ2,α,β (T,S(·)) is now written as
K(T ) = K˜∗n∗
(
1 + θ∗n
S(T )− S(tn∗)
S(tn∗)
)
, θ∗n =
1+ δ2
δ1 + δ2 + δ1δ2
ν∗n.
Since |S(T )−S(tn∗ )
S(tn∗ )
|<max(δ1, δ2), we have
logK(T ) = log K˜∗n∗ +O(1) = n∗D
(
hn∗
n∗
∥∥∥ρ
)
− 1
2
logn∗ +O(1). (9)
Define
TV (η,T ) =
n∗∑
i=1
| logS(ti)− logS(ti−1)|= hn∗η1 + tn∗η2, (10)
L(η,T ) = logS(tn∗)− logS(0) = hn∗η1 − tn∗η2, (11)
σ(η,T ) =
L(η,T )
TV (η,T )
=
hn∗η1 − tn∗η2
hn∗η1 + tn∗η2
.
We call TV (η,T ) the total η-variation of logS(t) in the interval [0, T ]. We also write
L(T ) = logS(T )− logS(0) = L(η,T ) +O(max(η1, η2)).
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We can then express (9) as
logK(T ) = n∗D(p(η,T )‖ρ)− 12 logn∗ +O(1), (12)
where
p(η,T ) =
hn∗
n∗
=
η2(1 + σ(η,T ))
η1(1− σ(η,T )) + η2(1 + σ(η,T )) .
Also, from (10) and (11), n∗ can be written as
n∗ =
(
η1 + η2 − σ(η,T )(η1 − η2)
2η1η2
)
TV (η,T ). (13)
Let η1k = a
−k
1 , η2k = a
−k
2 for a1, a2 > 1, k = 1,2, . . . , and let log(1 + δ1k) = η1k, log(1 +
δ2k) = η2k. We consider a sequence of the discretized games with δk = (δ1k, δ2k) and let
Kk(T ) be the Investor’s capital at t= T for the beta-binomial strategy in each game. We
denote the values of n∗, ρ by n∗k, ρk corresponding to ηk = (η1k, η2k).
We are now ready to give a proof of Theorem 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Take a1 = a2 = a > 1 and write ηk = a
−k, log(1+ δk) = ηk. We
then have
n∗k =
TV (ηk, T )
ηk
, p(ηk, T ) =
1+ σ(ηk, T )
2
, ρk =
1
2+ δk
.
Note that ρk→ 1/2 as k→∞. More precisely,
ρk =
1
2
− δk
4
+ o(δk).
Consider n∗kD(p(ηk, T )‖ρk) in (12). Since n∗k can be made arbitrarily large uniformly in
S(·) ∈EcA,0,T , we only need to consider k and S(·) ∈EcA,0,T such that p(ηk, T ) is close to
1/2. Now use the Taylor expansion
D
(
1+ d1
2
∥∥∥1+ d2
2
)
=
1
2
(d1 − d2)2 + o(|d1 − d2|2),
with d1 = σ(ηk, T ), d2 = −δk/2. Hence, noting δk = eηk − 1 = a−k + O(a−2k), we can
evaluate n∗kD(p(ηk, T )‖ρk) as
n∗kD(p(ηk, T )‖ρk) ≃ akTV (ηk, T )×
1
2
(
L(T )
TV (ηk, T )
+
1
2ak
)2
(14)
=
1
2
[
ak
TV (ηk, T )
L2(T ) +L(T ) +
1
4
TV (ηk, T )
ak
]
.
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Let H > 0.5 and consider S(·) ∈ EH,C,T1,T2 . It is easily seen that there exists some c
such that
TV (ηk, T )≤ caBk, B = (1−H)/H < 1
for all k and for all S(·) ∈ EH,C,T1,T2 . In this case, ak/TV (ηk, T )→ ∞ as k → ∞
uniformly in S(·) ∈ EH,C,T1,T2 . As seen from the argument below at the end of the
proof, for S(·) ∈ EcA,0,T , we only need to consider the case |L(T )| ≥ A/4. Therefore,
n∗kD(p(ηk, T )‖ρk)→∞ uniformly in S(·) ∈ EH,C,T1,T2 . Also, it is easily verified that
logn∗k in (9) is of smaller order than n
∗
kD(p(ηk, T )‖ρk).
Now let H < 0.5 and consider S(·) ∈EH,C,T1,T2 . There then exist some c and k0 such
that
TV (ηk, T )≥ caBk, B = (1−H)/H > 1
for all k ≥ k0 and all S(·) ∈ EH,C,T1,T2 . In this case, TV (ηk, T )/ak →∞ as k →∞
uniformly in S(·) ∈EH,C,T1,T2 . Again, logn∗k can be ignored.
Thus, we have the following behavior of Kk(T ) according to the values of the upper
and the lower Ho¨lder exponents.
If H > 0.5, S(·) ∈EH,C,T1,T2 ∩EcA,0,T and |L(T )| ≥
A
4
, then Kk(T )→∞.
If H < 0.5, S(·) ∈EH,C,T1,T2 ∩EcA,0,T , then Kk(T )→∞.
We can guarantee the condition |L(T )| ≥ A/4 above in the following manner. Let
Investor divide his initial capital K(0) = 1 into two accounts with the initial capitals
K1(0)+K2(0) = 1. For the first account, Investor follows the high-frequency trading strat-
egy explained above. For the second account, Investor starts the game at the first time
tA(< T ) when | logS(tA)− logS(0)| ≥A/2 and follows the same high-frequency trading
strategy. We denote Investor’s capitals of respective accounts at t= T by Kk1(T ),Kk2(T ).
Then,
max(| logS(T )− logS(0)|, | logS(T )− logS(tA)|)≥ A
4
on EcA,0,T . Therefore, at least one of Kk1(T ),Kk2(T ) diverges to infinity. This proves the
theorem. 
For numerical comparison of capital processes, it is useful to approximate the capital
process for the simple case. If TV (ηk, T )≃ caBk, then (14) is rewritten as
n∗kD(p(ηk, T )‖ρk)≃
1
2
[
a(1−B)k
c
L2(T ) +L(T ) +
ca(B−1)k
4
]
. (15)
We also investigate the capital Kk(T ) for two other cases: (ii) a1 < a2, (iii) a1 > a2. From
(13) with TV k =TV (ηk, T ), pk = p(ηk, T ), we have
n∗kpk ≃ 12ak1(TV k +L), n∗k(1− pk)≃ 12ak2(TV k −L),
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so it follows that
n∗kD(pk‖ρk) = n∗kpk log
pk
ρk
+ n∗k(1− pk) log
1− pk
1− ρk
(16)
≃ 1
2
[
ak1(TV k +L) log
pk
ρk
+ ak2(TV k −L) log
1− pk
1− ρk
]
.
(ii) a1 < a2: In this case, pk, ρk→ 0 as k→∞. However, the expression (16) has the
following approximation:
n∗kD(pk‖ρk)≃
1
2
ak1(TV k +L)
[
log
TV k +L
TV k −L −
2L
TV k +L
]
≃
(
ak1
TV (ηk, T )
)
L2(T ). (17)
Suppose that TV (ηk, T )≃ caBk1 . (17) is then rewritten as
n∗kD(pk‖ρk)≃
a
(1−B)k
1
c
L2(T ) (18)
and we can derive the behavior of Kk(T ) as follows:
if H > 0.5 and |L(T )| ≥ A
4
, then Kk(T )→∞,
which is the only case such that Kk(T )→∞.
(iii) a1 > a2: In this case, pk, ρk → 1 as k→∞. Again, the expression (16) has the
following approximation:
n∗kD(pk‖ρk) ≃
1
2
ak2(TV k −L)
[
log
TV k −L
TV k +L
+
2L
TV k −L +
2L
TV k −La
−k
2 +
1
2
a−2k2
]
(19)
≃
(
ak2
TV (ηk, T )
)
L2(T ) +L(T ) +
1
4
(
TV (ηk, T )
ak2
)
.
Suppose that TV (ηk, T )≃ caBk2 . (19) is then rewritten as
n∗kD(pk‖ρk)≃
a
(1−B)k
2
c
L2(T ) +L(T ) +
ca
(B−1)k
2
4
(20)
and, as in the case of a1 = a2, the same behavior of Kk(T ) is derived.
If H > 0.5 and |L(T )| ≥ A
4
, then Kk(T )→∞.
If H < 0.5, then Kk(T )→∞.
We note that when a= a2, the exponential growth part (20) is twice as large as (15).
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4. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we proposed a new formulation of continuous-time games in the frame-
work of the game-theoretic probability of Shafer and Vovk [15]. The present approach
can be extended to prove that Investor can essentially force other properties of Market’s
path corresponding to various probability laws in continuous-time stochastic processes.
Vovk [19] provided an approach to point processes and diffusion processes from the pre-
quential viewpoint, but it was not developed further from the game-theoretic viewpoint.
Extending the approach of the present paper, Vovk [20–22] has now fully developed the
formulation of continuous-time processes in the game-theoretic probability setting within
the conventional analysis.
From a theoretical perspective, it is important to consider taking the countable closure
of the move space F0 of Investor. For the discrete-time games, there is no conceptual
difficulty in considering static mixtures of countably many strategies. Even in continuous-
time games, there is no conceptual difficulty in dividing the initial capital into countably
many accounts and applying separate strategies to each account. Suppose that Investor
can essentially force an event E. He can then divide his initial capital of one as
1 = 12 +
1
4 + · · ·
and put 1/2i into the ith account as the initial capital. He applies the corresponding
strategy PC with C = 2i in Definition 2.2 to the ith account until KP2
i
≥ 1. He then
collects one (dollar) from each account and his capital diverges to infinity. This argument
shows that if Investor can essentially force E, then he can force E, provided that static
mixtures of countable strategies are allowed. In Vovk’s new formulation [20–22], static
mixtures of strategies are properly formulated and the notion of forcing is well defined
for continuous-time games.
Our main Theorem 3.1 is stated in terms of the essential forcing of events (4) and (5).
There is some gap between these two sets of functions. In particular, the set (5) may be
too small. We used this definition for convenience in employing our simple limit order
type strategy. A stronger statement in terms of the variation exponent vexS has been
established in Theorem 1 of Vovk [21].
Finally, we comment on the differences between our approach and standard measure-
theoretic approaches to no arbitrage and the Ho¨lder exponent. A general theory of ar-
bitrage was established by Delbaen and Schachermayer [4] (see also [5]) and it clarifies
exact mathematical relations among various conditions concerning no arbitrage. Later,
Rogers [14] gave an explicit trading strategy, but assumed a fractional Brownian motion
with H 6= 1/2. In these measure-theoretic works, a stochastic process is given first and
the effect of a trading strategy on probabilities over the set of paths is studied. On the
contrary, we do not make any probabilistic assumptions. Furthermore, we study the be-
havior of an explicit strategy against each individual price path, rather than subsets of
the set of paths.
1258 K. Takeuchi, M. Kumon and A. Takemura
Acknowledgments
The authors are grateful to Norio Kono, Makoto Maejima and the referees for valuable
comments and suggestions.
References
[1] Borodin, A.N. and Salminen, P. (2002). Handbook of Brownian Motion – Facts and For-
mulae, 2nd ed. Basel: Birkha¨user. MR1912205
[2] Cover, T.M. (1991). Universal portfolios. Math. Finance 1 1–29. MR1113417
[3] Cover, T.M. and Thomas, J.A. (2006). Elements of Information Theory, 2nd ed. New York:
Wiley. MR2239987
[4] Delbaen, F. and Schachermayer, W. (1994). A general version of the fundamental theorem
of asset pricing. Math. Ann. 300 463–520. MR1304434
[5] Delbaen, F. and Schachermayer, W. (2006). The Mathematics of Arbitrage. Heidelberg:
Springer. MR2200584
[6] Embrechts, P. and Maejima, M. (2002). Selfsimilar Processes. New Jersey: Princeton Univ.
Press. MR1920153
[7] Hobson, D. (2004). A survey of mathematical finance. Proc. R. Soc. Lond. Ser. A 460
3369–3401. MR2166295
[8] Horikoshi, Y. and Takemura, A. (2008). Implications of contrarian and one-sided strategies
for the fair-coin game. Stochastic Processes Appl. 118 2125–2142. MR2462292
[9] Kelly, J.L. Jr. (1956). A new interpretation of information rate. Bell System Technical
Journal 35 917–926. MR0090494
[10] Kumon, M. and Takemura, A. (2008). On a simple strategy weakly forcing the strong law of
large numbers in the bounded forecasting game. Ann. Inst. Statist. Math. 60 801–812.
MR2453572
[11] Kumon, M., Takemura, A. and Takeuchi, K. (2007). Game-theoretic versions of strong law
of large numbers for unbounded variables. Stochastics 79 449–468. MR2356520
[12] Kumon, M., Takemura, A. and Takeuchi, K. (2008). Capital process and optimality prop-
erties of a Bayesian Skeptic in coin-tossing games. Stoch. Anal. Appl. 26 1161–1180.
MR2464276
[13] Kunitomo, N. (1992). Long-memory and geometric Brownian motion in security market
models. Discussion Paper 92-F-12, Faculty of Economics, Univ. Tokyo.
[14] Rogers, L.C.G. (1997). Arbitrage with fractional Brownian motion. Math. Finance 7 95–
106. MR1434408
[15] Shafer, G. and Vovk, V. (2001). Probability and Finance: It’s Only a Game! New York:
Wiley. MR1852450
[16] Shannon, C.E. (1948). A mathematical theory of communication. Bell System Technical
Journal 27 379–423, 623–656. MR0026286
[17] Takemura, A. and Suzuki, T. (2007). Game theoretic derivation of discrete distributions
and discrete pricing formulas. J. Japan Statist. Soc. 37 87–104. MR2405283
[18] Takeuchi, K. (2004). Kake no suuri to kinyu kogaku (Mathematics of Betting and Financial
Engineering). Tokyo: Saiensusha (in Japanese).
[19] Vovk, V. (1993). Forecasting point and continuous processes. Test 2 189–217. MR1265490
[20] Vovk, V. (2007). Continuous-time trading and the emergence of randomness. Available at
arXiv:0712.1275v2. Stochastics, to appear.
A new formulation of asset trading games in continuous time 1259
[21] Vovk, V. (2008). Continuous-time trading and the emergence of volatility. Electron. Com-
mun. Probab. 13 319–324. MR2415140
[22] Vovk, V. (2008). Game-theoretic Brownian motion. Available at arXiv:0801.1309v1.
[23] Vovk, V. and Shafer, G. (2003). A game-theoretic explanation of the
√
dt effect. Working
Paper No. 5. Available at http://www.probabilityandfinance.com .
Received April 2008 and revised December 2008
